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This paper proposes a microeconomic decomposition of the evolution of income
inequality in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s, allowing the in-depth analysis of simultaneous
contributions of four types of phenomena to the evolution of the distribution of income:
a change in the remuneration rates of observed and unobserved earnings determinants, a
change in occupational preferences, and a change in the sociodemographic population
structure. I show, for instance, that the increase in income inequality in Abidjan was the
result of changes in the sociodemographic population structure and of changes in
unobserved earnings determinants, even though higher activity, inflows in wage labour,
a drop in returns to schooling, and the Ivorian/non-Ivorian wage differential worked
toward a more equal distribution. Concerning the link between growth and inequality, it
is interesting to note that both negative income growth in Abidjan as well as positive
income growth in rural Côte d'Ivoire, were connected with rising inequality.
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After strong and sustained growth during the 1960s and 1970s in an environment
of rising international commodity prices,1 Cˆ ote d’Ivoire saw its average annual GDP
per capita growth rate between 1978 to 1993 fall to -3.7 percent. This period was
marked by a signiﬁcant loss of competitiveness, sharp deterioration in the terms of
trade as well as a strong increase in the external debt. Measures to stabilize the
economy and structural reforms pursued by the Ivorian authorities since 1981 have
not been suﬃcient to restore competitiveness or external viability (Bourguignon and
Berth´ elemy 1996; Cogneau and Mespl´ e-Somps 2001; IMF 1998, 2000).
The failure of the internal adjustment strategy in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire–one of the most
signiﬁcant economies of the 14 member countries of the CFA2 Franc zone–led to a 50
percent devaluation of CFA Franc parity in relation to the French Franc in January
1994. Numerous structural measures followed the devaluation in the framework of a
fund-supported program by the World Bank and the IMF.
The growth rate of real GDP per capita was -1.7 percent in 1994, but attained over 3
percent in the three years following. After the initial passage of higher import prices
following devaluation, inﬂation has stabilized at under 6 percent, on average annually
since 1996. Growth recovery was mainly due to a strong increase in the production
of export crops (cocoa +62 percent, coﬀee +107 percent in volume) and cotton (+9
percent), favoured by the devaluation and high world market prices,3 and due to a
good performance in the manufacturing sector, agro-industry, and energy sector.
From a political point of view, it is important to study how these profound economic
changes as well as the accompanying high population growth (including immigration)
aﬀected the distribution of income and social welfare. Existing papers studying the
evolution of inequality and poverty in the 1990s in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire (see e.g. Jones and
Ye 1997; World Bank 1997) remain very limited regarding two aspects. First, using
household surveys from 1993 and 1995 the timeframe is too short to say anything of
value on the medium term eﬀects of the changes that occurred in the early 1990s, and
second, because of their very descriptive character and their focus on consumption,
they can tell us very little about the mechanisms through which poverty ratios and
the distribution of income may have been aﬀected.
Other studies, of a more analytical approach, used computable general equilibrium
models to compare the distributional eﬀects of diﬀerent adjustment strategies open to
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire (Bourguignon, de Melo and Suwa-Eisenmann 1995; Calipel and Guillau-
mont Jeanneney 1996; Cogneau and Collange 1998). The advantage of these analyses
is their macro-economic closure, but by relying on the representative agent hypothesis
1Cˆ ote d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa, before Ghana and Indonesia.
2Communaut´ e ﬁnanci` ere d’Afrique.
3The nominal producer prices of cocoa increased in the ﬁve years following the devaluation 1994-
1998 by 0%, 57.5%, 1.6%, 0% and 42.2%. The corresponding increases of the coﬀee prices were
21.4%, 282%, 7.7%, -38.6% and 4% (IMF 1998).
2they cannot tell us about individual responses to macro-economic changes, and their
implications for developments in overall income inequality.
In the present paper, I use microsimulation techniques, developed by Bourguignon,
Fournier and Gurgand (2001), to distinguish the respective contribution of four types
of phenomena to the evolution of household income distribution in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire
during the 1990s: (i) a change in the remuneration rates of observed earnings de-
terminants, (ii) a change in the remuneration rates of unobserved earnings deter-
minants, (iii) a change in occupational choice behaviour, and (iv) changes in the
socio-demographic population structure. Thus, this methodology allows the iden-
tiﬁcation of the main channels and mechanisms through which income distribution
has been aﬀected. The analysis is based on two household surveys carried out in
1992/93 and 1998, which constitute the most recent available micro-data for Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire. This study is, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst application of this methodology to
an African country, and to an economy characterized by a large agricultural sector.
Furthermore, it oﬀers an original modelling of intra-household labour allocation.
This study hopes also to contribute to the general debate about the link between
growth, inequality and poverty alleviation. It seems that there is a rising consensus
that results from cross-country studies (e.g. Dollar and Kraay 2000) are only seriously
generalisable and that data remain a principal problem. Therefore more and more
economists (e.g. Bourguignon 2000; Banerjee and Duﬂo 2001; Ravallion 2001) today
argue that we can learn more from country speciﬁc case studies. This analyses oﬀers
such an approach.
The next section gives a brief description of the evolution of income distribution,
poverty and some related economic and socio-demographic characteristics in Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire. Section 3 explains the methodology. Section 4 presents the econometric
estimation of the occupational choice, wage and proﬁt functions. Section 5 presents
various microsimulations and derives from them a decomposition of the change of
income distribution and poverty ratios.
1 The evolution of income distribution between
1992/93–1998: basic facts and sources of change
The following description, like the rest of the paper, is based on two national repre-
sentative household surveys that were jointly undertaken by the Institut National de
la Statistique of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire (INS) and the World Bank. First, the Enquˆ ete Priori-
taire (EP) which was started in 1992 (Abidjan), and ﬁnished in 1993 (other cities and
rural areas). Second, the Enquˆ e t ed eN i v e a ud eV i e(ENV) which was carried out in
1998. A two stage stratiﬁed design was used to sample a total of 9 600 (57 433) and
4 200 households (24 211 individuals) respectively, spread over ﬁve regions and 200
districts.
3Evolution of mean household income and its components
Table 1
Evolution of mean household income 1992/93–1998
weighted obs., in 1000 Abidjan other urban
1998 CFAF, adjusted to Abidjana 1992 1998 gp.a. 1993 1998 gp.a.
Mean household income 2 488 2 264 -1.6% 1 561 1 536 -0.3%
Wage incomeb 1 370 1 444 0.9% 636 766 3.8%
Non-farm self-employ. incomeb 612 509 -3.0% 526 439 -3.6%
Farm incomebc 10 17 9.6 % 1061161.8%
export crops (cotton, coﬀee, cocoa) 4 11 20.1% 20 5622.7%
food crops 3 12 27.9% 25 25 -0.2%
cost of labour 7 9 5.0% 13 12 -2.7%
self-consumptiond 2 7 20.6% 72 60 -3.6%
livest., ﬁsh, a. huntinge 7 22 21.7% 66 -0.7%
Other income sources 237 123 -10.4% 172 81 -14.0%
Received transfersf 260 172 -6.6% 121 135 2.2%
Mean hh. inc. by active hh. member 1 6 861 418 -2.9% 1 0161 049 0.6 %
Mean hh. expendituresg 2 797 2 576-1.4% 1 588 1 6 06 0.2%
rural national
1993 1998 gp.a. 1993 1998 gp.a.
Mean household income 950 1 341 7.1% 1 383 1 5862.8%
Wage incomeb 92 251 22.2% 460 632 6.6%
Non-farm self-employ. incomeb 96107 2.1% 291 274 -1.2%
Farm incomebc 675 888 5.6% 420 513 4.1%
export crops (cotton, coﬀee, cocoa) 138 371 21.8% 86216 20.3%
food crops 123 110 -2.2% 77 68 -2.7%
cost of labour 43 51 3.5% 29 32 2.0%
self-consumptiond 433 439 0.3% 268 252 -1.2%
livest., ﬁsh, a. huntinge 17 3616 .9% 12 2615.8%
Other income sources 34 24 -6.6% 104 59 -10.7%
Received transfersf 53 70 6.0% 108 108 0.1%
Mean hh. inc. by active hh. member 421 614 7.8% 788 886 2.4%
Mean hh. expendituresg 1 094 1 415 5.3% 1 532 1 710 2.2%
Notes:
a The price deﬂator series 1992-1998 published by the Institut National de la Statistique (INS) of Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire and the World Bank (2000) is used. To adjust incomes to the level of Abidjan, regional deﬂators
constructed by Grootaert and Kanbur (1994) and revised by the INS (see Jones and Ye 1997) are used.
b In the EP 1992/93 individual earnings from dependent labour and non-farm self-employment were only
collected from the ﬁrst and second decision maker in the household. Wages and proﬁts for the other household
members supplying labour in these activities are imputed to make the data of the two surveys comparable.
The method used is described in section 4.2.
c The four income sources minus the cost of labour do not exactly add up to the total farm income, because
extreme values were omitted here and not replaced by imputed values.
d Self-consumption in the EP 1992/93 was corrected as proposed by Jones and Ye (1997).
e In the EP 1992/93 income from hunting was included in “other income sources”.
f Including subsidies for education and transport, monetary aid, food aid and non-food aid received from
individuals outside the household as well as pensions and insurance premiums.
g Including expenditure for durable and non-durable consumption items , self-consumption and transfers
made to other households, but without taxes on wages and income. For house owners no rent was imputed
here.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; computations by the author.
It can be seen in Table 1 that in the 1990s, real average household income declined
in Abidjan (-1.6 percent p.a.), the economic capital of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, more or less
stagnated in other cities (-0.3), and strongly increased in rural areas (+7.1).4 The
4Unfortunately no reliable regional price index exits for the 1990s. The adjustment to Abidjan
prices was thus undertaken before and after the devaluation of the CFA Franc by the same regional
deﬂators (see notes of Table 1). However, it is likely that the devaluation aﬀected regional price
4same can be stated for the mean household income per active household member.
For all three strata, the evolution of average household income between 1992/93 and
1998 complies with the observed evolution of average household expenditures. How-
ever, the various income sources altered very diﬀerently. In Abidjan income from
farm activities increased, whereas income from non-farm self-employment, transfer
income and income from other sources decreased. Wage income stagnated. The in-
tensiﬁcation of agricultural activity in Abidjan could indicate that households tried
to cope with the downturn of market income by higher home-production. In con-
trast, in rural areas the income from the three main sources as well as from transfers
increased. The expansion was particularly marked for income from export crops and
wages. This evolution conﬁrms that the sales of cocoa, coﬀee, and cotton have ben-
eﬁtted from the devaluation of the CFA Franc and by the signiﬁcant rise in world
market prices, but also by an exceptional increase in cocoa production by historical
standards, independent of the former evolutions.5
Below it can be noted that the distinct evolution of the various income items resulted
in signiﬁcant changes in the the overall distribution of household income and poverty.
One aim of this paper is thus to analyse why the diﬀerent income shares altered
so disparately, i.e. due to changes in price, in occupational choice, in population
structure, or in all these factors together.
Changes in income inequality and poverty
Table 2 summarizes some basic indicators of the distribution of household income per
adult equivalent (Oxford Scale6) and some measures of poverty. For Abidjan, the data
show an increase of 3.2 points in the Gini coeﬃcient of the distribution of household
income. The poorest inhabitants of the Ivorian economic capital seem to have lost
during and after the devaluation, whereas the richest sections of the population seem
to have gained during this period. However, the share of households living in extreme
poverty and “normal” poverty, deﬁned as having a household income per day and
capita below US$1 and US$2 respectively, remained more or less stable.
While in the other cities the distribution of household income did not alter signiﬁ-
cantly between 1993 and 1998, absolute poverty decreased by 10% when retaining the
US$2 poverty line. In this context, it is important to note that the stratum “other
cities” is a very heterogenous one, comprising more than 65 cities, ranging from 5 000
to 550 000 habitants. In addition, the continuing urbanization process during the pe-
riod under study may have led to a continuous expansion of this stratum. Problems
may arise concerning the relative representiveness of the two samples.
In contrast, in rural Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, income dispersion increased strongly and in 1998
reached a level comparable to that in urban areas. The Gini coeﬃcient for 1998 was
diﬀerences and especially the urban/rural price diﬀerential.
5The increase in income stemming from the production of export crops would have been even
bigger if the CAISTAB had not taxed away a part of the surplus.
6The robustness of the results has been tested using alternative equivalence scales. The distribu-
tion did not change signiﬁcantly.
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Evolution of the distribution of household income per adult equivalent 1992/93–1998
weighted obs. Abidjan other urb. rural nat.
1998 CFAF, adj. to Abidj. 1992 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER ADULT EQUIVALENTa (Oxford scale)
Shares of
Poorest 10 % 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.012
Poorest 20 % 0.038 0.034 0.040 0.038 0.054 0.043 0.044 0.037
Poorest 40 % 0.121 0.111 0.133 0.117 0.161 0.132 0.139 0.117
Richest 20 % 0.538 0.575 0.523 0.5360.470 0.533 0.517 0.559
Richest 10 % 0.380 0.422 0.360 0.370 0.308 0.376 0.362 0.402
Richest 5 % 0.265 0.303 0.249 0.251 0.197 0.269 0.253 0.292
Summary inequality measures
Gini coeﬃcientb 0.497 0.529 0.489 0.487 0.417 0.480 0.494 0.508
Theil index 0.4860.56 5 0.4560.450 0.317 0.491 0.4860.534
Mean logarithmic deviation 0.505 0.692 0.511 0.539 0.393 0.472 0.512 0.563
Atkinson (e=0.5) 0.208 0.239 0.202 0.201 0.149 0.204 0.207 0.223
Atkinson (e=1) 0.395 0.497 0.399 0.415 0.325 0.381 0.400 0.431
HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA
P0 (poverty line: US$1 c ) 0.121 0.145 0.263 0.233 0.363 0.271 0.294 0.235
P0 (poverty line: US$2 c ) 0.342 0.352 0.557 0.502 0.711 0.583 0.604 0.514
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES PER ADULT EQUIVALENT (Oxford scale)
Gini coeﬃcient 0.3960.424 0.392 0.387 0.349 0.371 0.417 0.412
Notes (see also notes of Table 1):
a Negative and zero incomes have been set to one.
b Lorenz dominance, that is the Lorenz curve of t is everywhere above that of t :
Abidjan: 1992 dominates 1998; other urban: Lorenz curves are crossing; rural: 1993 dominates 1998; national:
Lorenz curves are crossing.
First order stochastic dominance, that is the cumulative distribution function of (real) income of t is every-
where above that of t :
Abidjan: 1992 ﬁrst-order dominates 1998; other urban: cumulative distribution functions are crossing; rural:
1998 ﬁrst-order dominates 1993; national: 1998 ﬁrst-order dominates 1993.
c US$1 PPP1985: 110 700 CFAF 1998; US$2 PPP1985: 221 400 CFAF 1998 (for details concerning the
computation of the poverty lines, see DIAL 2000).
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; computations by the author.
6.3 points above the Gini coeﬃcient for 1993. The Theil index and the evolution of
income shares of the diﬀerent income quantiles show that dispersion rose mainly at the
top of the distribution. However, the rise in inequality was accompanied by a strong
increase in average household income per capita, which was reﬂected by a remarkable
reduction in absolute poverty. Whereas in 1993 36 percent of all households lived
with less than US$1 per day per capita, this ratio fell to 27 percent in 1998.
Across all regions, the Gini coeﬃcient increased slightly (+1.4 points).7 The high
level of income inequality in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, particularly in urban areas with a Gini
coeﬃcient ranging from 0.48 to 0.53 is in line with estimates for the 1980s. Kozel
7The inequality measures for distribution of expenditure per capita indicate a lower level of in-
equality than the measures for the distribution of income per capita; this is a usual observation
and stems generally from higher measurement error in the income variable, particularly for low-
income groups, an underestimation of non-market income (e.g. transfers), and signiﬁcant savings of
high-income groups not taken into account by the expenditure variable. Likewise absolute poverty
measured in terms of expenditure using the same data set is lower than in terms of income (see
Grimm, Gu´ enard, and Mespl´ e-Somps 2001). However, the evolution of distribution of expenditures
per adult equivalent between 1992/93 and 1998 complies completely with the evolution observed for
the income variable.
6(1990), for instance, estimated a Gini coeﬃcient for income distribution of 0.54.
Demographic change and variations in occupational structure
In what follows I focus on the population at working age, which here is deﬁned as
individuals above eleven years of age. At age twelve, school enrolment begins to
decline, the share of working children reaches 20 percent, and it can be assumed that
twelve-year-old children are able to contribute signiﬁcantly to household production.
Table 3
Evolution of the socio-economic population structure, 1992/93–1998,
(population 12 years and older)
weighted obs. Abidjan other urb. rural national
proportions in percent 1992 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
MEN
Age structure
12 to 14 11.5 9.8 15.5 15.0 14.4 13.5 14.0 13.0
15 to 24 30.5 35.2 33.5 35.627.8 30.3 29.7 32.8
25 to 44 43.9 40.3 32.0 32.4 29.633.0 33.2 34.5
45 to 64 12.7 13.2 15.0 13.4 20.3 16.4 17.5 14.9
65 and older 1.4 1.5 4.0 3.7 7.9 6.8 5.6 4.8
Non-Ivorian 27.626 .7 25.0 20.1 18.616 .1 22.0 19.6
Married 41.634.640.2 38.3 48.1 48.3 44.9 42.7
Distrib. by school. levels
No education 25.623.0 40.0 33.3 59.0 54.1 47.641.8
Prim. school but no dipl. achiev. 23.0 21.3 18.9 21.9 20.1 25.620.4 23.7
Primary school 28.8 27.0 25.628.0 16 .5 15.4 21.2 21.2
Lower secondary 16.3 17.5 12.6 12.0 3.7 3.8 8.4 9.0
H i g h e r s e c o n d a r y 3 . 06 . 71 . 52 . 20 . 60 . 61 . 32 . 4
P o s t - s e c o n d a r y 3 . 44 . 51 . 42 . 50 . 20 . 51 . 12 . 0
Occupation (main activity)a
Inactive (excl. enrolled/trainees) 22.5 21.7 15.8 15.1 7.7 7.5 12.7 12.7
Enrolled or in training 30.8 29.2 33.635.9 13.0 13.8 21.622.8
Wage labour 32.0 36.0 20.4 25.9 5.7 12.2 14.6 21.1
Non-farm self-empl. 12.5 11.3 14.2 12.2 2.7 2.9 7.5 7.1
Unpaid family work (non-farm) 1.3 0.9 1.9 2.60.4 4.3 0.9 3.1
Self-empl. in agricul. 0.8 0.8 8.9 6.0 43.0 35.5 26.1 20.1
Food crop farmer 6,7 3,4 21,4 15,0 13,6 8,8
Export crop farmerb 2,1 2,621,620,5 12,5 11,4
Unpaid family work (farm) 0.1 0.1 5.2 2.3 27.623.9 16 .613.0
Multi-activity (among actives) 4.0 5.9 12.8 10.1 9.9 13.5 9.611.5
Table 3 shows some basic socio-demographic statistics for the population at working
age. It would take too much space to comment on all structural changes occurring in
the 1990s, thus I will only shed light on the variations in occupational choices, which
are particularly important for the understanding of the rest of the paper.
For men, the activity rate increased from 46.7 to 49.1 percent in Abidjan (certainly
signifying to a large extend a reduction in unemployment) and stagnated at around
50 percent in other cities, and around 80 percent in rural areas. In all zones wage
labour increased, which complies with the observed rise in the share of wage income
in other urban cities and in rural areas. An increase in employment in the modern
private sector has also been noted by Cogneau and Mespl´ e-Somps (2001). A part of
the increase in wage labour may also be due to an important number of immigrants
7Table 3
(... cont.)
weighted obs. Abidjan other urb. rural national
proportions in percent 1992 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
WOMEN
Age structure
12 to 14 13.8 13.2 14.5 14.1 11.610.3 12.7 11.9
15 to 24 36.4 36.9 33.5 38.1 26.1 29.3 30.0 33.2
25 to 44 41.1 39.2 36.4 33.5 37.7 38.4 38.1 37.4
45 to 64 7.7 9.5 13.3 12.0 20.1 16.9 15.9 14.0
65 and older 1.1 1.3 2.4 2.2 4.5 5.1 3.3 3.5
Non-Ivorian 24.3 22.5 23.2 17.3 16.6 11.7 19.8 15.6
Married 44.4 38.8 48.0 55.3 62.2 60.7 55.1 51.8
Distrib. by school. levels
No education 45.4 39.0 58.7 53.1 79.5 76.3 67.4 62.1
Prim. school but no dipl. achiev. 25.4 23.617.4 21.2 13.7 17.0 17.0 19.5
Primary school 20.2 25.4 18.7 20.9 6.1 5.9 12.1 14.0
L o w e r s e c o n d a r y 7 . 08 . 14 . 83 . 80 . 50 . 62 . 93 . 1
Higher secondary 1.2 2.8 0.3 0.60.1 0.2 0.4 0.9
P o s t - s e c o n d a r y 0 . 91 . 20 . 10 . 50 . 00 . 10 . 20 . 4
Occupation (main activity)a
Inactive (excl. enrolled/trainees) 47.3 44.3 40.5 38.2 17.1 18.8 29.0 29.4
Enrolled or in training 19.7 20.8 17.8 21.65.2 6 .9 11.2 13.7
Wage labour 9.4 17.0 5.69.5 1.1 4.2 3.9 8.4
Non-farm self-empl. 20.7 16.1 23.4 20.2 7.3 5.6 14.0 11.6
Unpaid family work (non-farm) 2.61.63.5 3.60.9 6 .8 1.9 4.9
Self-empl. in agricul. 0.0 0.1 1.9 1.66 .0 5.8 3.8 3.5
Unpaid family work (farm) 0.3 0.1 7.3 5.3 62.4 51.9 36.3 28.5
Multi-activity (among actives) 1.1 1.9 3.8 5.3 3.2 4.1 3.1 4.0
ALLc
Average household size 6.1 5.6 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.8
Notes:
a The shares of individuals in the diﬀerent occupations are not directly comparable to those noted in the
transition matrices (Table 9), because in the transition matrices the reference population excludes individuals
who were enrolled in the education system or who were in professional training.
b According to the deﬁnition of the Institut National de la Statistique of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, farmers are considered
here as export crop farmers, if the sales of cocoa, coﬀee and cotton represent more than 50% of the total value
of agricultural production (33% in the Savannah Region).
c Without visitors and domestics.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; computations by the author.
from neighbouring countries who found jobs on the large cocoa and coﬀee plantations
in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. Non-farm self-employment decreased in urban areas and stagnated
in rural Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. The share of food crop farmers decreased, whereas the share
of export crop farmers increased. However, the total proportion of farmers declined
signiﬁcantly. The shares of family workers in non-farm activity and in farm activity
increased and decreased respectively. The proportion of men with more than one
professional activity rose in Abidjan, and particularly in rural regions.
The activity rate of women aged 12 years and over increased in Abidjan (from 33
to 35 percent), as did that for men, but decreased in other cities (from 41.7 to 40.2
percent), and in rural areas (from 78.4 to 74.3 percent). The proportion of female
wage earners and non-farm self-employed increased and decreased respectively. The
relative number of women who carried out at least two market activities increased.
8The fact that between 1992/93 and 1998 the proportion of self-employed farmers and
agricultural family workers declined and the proportion of wage workers increased
implies that the rise in agricultural income was partly generated by the additional
employment of non-family members.
The micro-simulations which follow show that changes in the population structure
as well as in occupational choices were important determinants of the changes in
inequality and poverty during the 1990s.
2 Methodological framework: a decomposition by
microsimulation
The chosen methodology was ﬁrst proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993),
and was subsequently further developed and applied particularly by Bourguignon
and Martinez (1996), Bourguigon, Fournier and Gurgand (1999, 2001), and Fournier
(1999). Therefore, this section is quite short and orientated to the presentations given
in the studies quoted.
Consider a simple household income function Y , where the income yit of household
i observed at time t is assumed to depend on four sets of arguments: its observable
socio-demographic characteristics, or those of its members (xit), unobservable char-
acteristics ( it), a vector of remuneration rates of the observed (βt) and unobserved
earnings determinants (σt), and, ﬁnally, a set of parameters deﬁning the participation
and occupational choice behaviour of its members (λt):
yit = Y (xit,  it,β t,σ t,λ t). (1)
The overall distribution of household income at time t, is then obtained by summariz-
ing all yit and some demographic characteristics possibly included in xit,e . g .t h es i z e
or composition of the household at t, in one vector Dt. Accordingly, Dt can be written
as a function H of the former parameters and the distribution of the observable and
unobservable household characteristics at date t:
Dt = H({xit,  it},β t,σ t,λ t), (2)
where {}refers to the distribution of the corresponding variables in the population.
Using this type of household income function, the diﬀerence between two distributions
Dt and Dt  observed over two distinct cross sections can be decomposed as resulting
from four diﬀerent causes: (i) a change in the remuneration rates of the observed
earnings determinants, (ii) a change in the remuneration rates of the unobserved
earnings determinants, (iii) a change in the occupational choice behaviour, and (iv)
changes in the distribution of observed and unobserved earnings determinants. This
9decomposition can formally be written as:
(i) : Btt  = H({xit,  it},β t ,σ t,λ t) − H({xit,  it},β t,σ t,λ t),
(ii) : Stt  = H({xit,  it},β t,σ t ,λ t) − H({xit,  it},β t,σ t,λ t),
(iii) : Ltt  = H({xit,  it},β t,σ t,λ t ) − H({xit,  it},β t,σ t,λ t),
(iv) : Ptt  = H({xit ,  it },β t,σ t,λ t) − H({xit,  it},β t,σ t,λ t).

   
   
(3)
Explained in words, this methodology assumes that the impact of a change in the
remuneration rates of the observed earnings determinants can be quantiﬁed by com-
paring the observed distribution at date t with the hypothetical distribution obtained
by simulating on the population observed at date t, the remuneration structure of
the observed earnings determinants at date t . In the same way we can also evaluate
variations in the other sets of parameters, or even in one single parameter (e.g. return
to education). The change in the remuneration rates of the unobservable earnings
determinants is measured by the change in the residual variance in earnings func-
tions.8 The eﬀect of changes in the distribution of observed and unobserved earnings
determinants can be estimated either, if panel data is available, by running the same
type of simulation as for the diﬀerent parameter sets, or by computing it as a residual
of the three other eﬀects. This can be seen by the following identity:
Ctt  = Btt  + Stt  + Ltt  + Ptt  (4)
where Ctt  is the overall change in the distribution between t and t . Here, and
accordingly for the three other eﬀects, it is important to note that the choice of
the initial and the terminal date matters. Thus, the decomposition methodology
implies path dependance. For example, a change in the return to education will
have a diﬀerent eﬀect on the distribution of income whether it is applied to a highly-
educated or a weakly-educated population. This means, that generally Ptt   = Pt t,
and likewise for B, S,a n dL. To assess the robustness of the results for each eﬀect,
the simulation will be performed in both directions.
The assumed household income generating model can be summarized by the following
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10The number of persons of working age (12 years and over) in household h is kh.
Equation (5) describes the labour supply of each household member i,w h e r et h e
index j stands respectively for the labour supplied as wage worker outside the family
business (W), the labour supplied as manager of the family farm (F), the labour
supplied as manager of a family non-farm business (NF), and the labour supplied as
family help (H) in either the family farm or the family non farm business. I stands
for inactivity. These functions express the labour supply of member i in household
h as a function of his/her personal characteristics xhi, and some characteristics of
the household and its environment zhi. In addition, they generally include the pro-
ductive assets available in the household, as cultivable land, and for other household
members than the household head, some characteristics of the household head, such
as his/her labour supply choice. The two surveys used in this study do not contain
suﬃcient information about the allocation of time between diﬀerent occupations, and
as a result, it is only considered whether individual i supplies labour or not in the
corresponding activity j.
Equation (6) is a wage function whose arguments are typical human capital proxies
and some other personal characteristics. Equation (7) is a proﬁt function contain-
ing as arguments personal characteristics of the household member who runs the
business, xhi, and some household characteristics, zhi, as available productive assets
and the uncompensated labour input supplied by other household members in the
corresponding business.
The variables vhi, uhi,a n dshi are the usual residual terms of the corresponding econo-
metric models. They can be interpreted as ‘ﬁxed’ individual eﬀects representing the
inﬂuence on wages, proﬁts and occupational choice behaviour of unobserved variables.
Naturally these terms can only be estimated for the individuals who are engaged in
the corresponding activity. Moreover they are not observed for the discrete labour
choice. As a result, for all non-participants these terms will be drawn randomly
conditionally on the estimated residual variance and the occupational choice that is
observed.
Equation (8) aggregates the diﬀerent income sources over the household members.
The term yt
0m summarizes income from other sources, including transfers, and income
from wealth. It is supposed as exogenous in the model. Income from wage work and
non-farm self-employment is observed at the individual level, whereas income from
farming is observed at the household level. As head of a farm, the person with the
highest order number among all household members having declared to manage a
farm is selected. The other involved family members are coded as family workers in
that farm.9
9In most cases only one household member declared himself to manage a farm, whereas the other
family members involved in agricultural activity declared themselves as family help.
113 Occupational choice, wage and proﬁt functions
3.1 Estimation of the occupational choice functions
Table 4a
Occupational choice – household heads, multinomial logit model,
marginal eﬀects evaluated at sample means
wage self-empl. self-empl.
labour non-agric. agricult.
Expl. variable 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
Schooling 0.021 0.016-0.014 ∗ -0.012 ∗ -0.021 ∗ -0.009 ∗
Pot. experience 0.011 ∗ 0.009 ∗ -0.001 ∗ 0.000 ∗ 0.001 ∗ -0.001 ∗
Pot. experience2/100 -0.022 ∗ -0.023 ∗ -0.003 ∗ -0.002 ∗ 0.002 ∗ 0.004 ∗
Woman -0.201 ∗ -0.266 ∗ 0.234 0.239 ∗ -0.051 ∗ -0.020 ∗
Non-Ivorian -0.028 ∗ 0.052 ∗ 0.169 ∗ 0.107 ∗ -0.070 -0.073
No land (Ref.)
Land: from 0 to 1 ha -0.412 ∗ -0.157 -0.316 ∗ -0.275 0.823 ∗ 0.517 ∗
Land: from 1 to 2 ha -0.467 ∗ -0.325 -0.447 -0.237 0.991 ∗ 0.574 ∗
Land: from 2 to 5 ha -0.498 ∗ -0.512 -0.450 -0.1761.104 ∗ 0.657 ∗
L a n d :f r o m5t o1 0h a - 0 . 4 65 ∗ -0.550 -0.658 ∗ -0.218 1.194 ∗ 0.712 ∗
Land: more than 10 ha -0.545 ∗ -0.480 -0.623 -0.246 1.232 ∗ 0.684 ∗
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban -0.077 ∗ -0.127 0.007 ∗ 0.009 0.185 ∗ 0.109 ∗
East Forest -0.023 -0.131 -0.238 -0.092 0.319 ∗ 0.265 ∗
West Forest -0.123 -0.041 -0.192 -0.132 0.377 ∗ 0.224 ∗
Savannah -0.242 -0.106-0.020 ∗ -0.141 0.424 ∗ 0.232 ∗
wage labour (Ref.)
and s.-empl. agr. inactivity
Expl. variable 1993 1998 1993 1998
Schooling 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.005
Pot. experience 0.002 ∗ 0.001 ∗ -0.013 -0.009
Pot. experience2/100 -0.005 ∗ -0.002 ∗ 0.028 0.023
Woman -0.075 ∗ -0.039 ∗ 0.092 0.085
Non-Ivorian 0.017 ∗ -0.009 -0.088 -0.078
No land (Ref.)
Land: from 0 to 1 ha 0.144 ∗ 0.140 ∗ -0.239 -0.226
Land: from 1 to 2 ha 0.140 ∗ 0.158 ∗ -0.218 -0.170
Land: from 2 to 5 ha 0.138 ∗ 0.154 ∗ -0.293 -0.122
L a n d :f r o m5t o1 0h a 0 . 1 2 8∗ 0.157 ∗ -0.198 -0.100
Land: more than 10 ha 0.134 ∗ 0.150 ∗ -0.197 -0.108
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban 0.010 ∗ 0.034 ∗ -0.124 -0.025
East Forest 0.0060.06 3 ∗ -0.063 -0.105
West Forest 0.016 ∗ 0.028 ∗ -0.078 -0.080
Savannah 0.019 ∗ 0.051 ∗ -0.181 -0.036
No. ofobservations 9 598 4 191
Pseudo R2 0.477 0.422
Notes: ∗ = coeﬃcient signiﬁcative at the 5% level, where inactivity is the reference category. Besides the
variables noted in the table, the model includes the following explicative variables: born in urban area, religion,
square root of household (hh.) size, dummy if inactive adults in hh. (without accounting for the individual
itself), and mean age of other hh. members.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
Assuming that the Ivorian labour market is imperfectly competitive, the ﬁve oc-
cupational choices mentioned above are distinguished, plus a sixth one which is self-
employed farmer and wage worker (multi-activity). I consider the population 12 years
old and over, outside the educational system and professional training. Educational
investment is thus taken as exogenous in the model. If agent i makes choice j,i ti s
12Table 4b
Occupational choice – spouses of household head, multinomial logit model,
marginal eﬀects evaluated at sample means
family wage self-empl.
help labour non-agric.
Expl. variable 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
Schooling -0.002 -0.014 0.011 ∗ 0.014 0.003 ∗ 0.005 ∗
Pot. experience -0.003 ∗ -0.005 ∗ 0.004 ∗ 0.009 ∗ 0.028 ∗ 0.026 ∗
Pot. experience2/100 -0.001 ∗ 0.002 -0.006 ∗ -0.011 -0.037 ∗ -0.036 ∗
Non-Ivorian -0.045 ∗ 0.063 0.000 -0.008 -0.058 ∗ -0.033 ∗
Prob. head wage labour -0.585 ∗ -0.417 ∗ 0.030 -0.003 0.023 ∗ 0.079
Prob. head self-empl. non-agric. -0.046-0.6 49 ∗ 0.024 -0.066 ∗ -0.005 -0.011 ∗
Prob. head self-empl. agric. 0.631 ∗ 0.873 ∗ -0.001 -0.180 -0.361 -0.344
HH. holds land (dummy) – – – – – –
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban 0.004 0.366 ∗ -0.005 -0.121 ∗ 0.018 -0.056
East Forest 0.173 ∗ 0.545 ∗ -0.005 -0.148 ∗ -0.202 ∗ -0.224 ∗
West Forest 0.200 ∗ 0.330 -0.016-0.091 -0.124 -0.132
Savannah 0.155 ∗ 0.521 ∗ -0.026-0.102 -0.143 ∗ -0.187
self-empl. (Ref.)
agricult. inactivity
Expl. variable 1993 1998 1993 1998
Schooling – – -0.012 -0.005
Pot. experience 0.000 ∗ 0.001 -0.029 -0.030
Pot. experience2/100 0.000 ∗ -0.001 0.043 0.046
Non-Ivorian 0.000 0.0060.103 -0.029
Prob. head wage labour 0.000 0.003 0.533 0.338
Prob. head self-empl. non-agric. 0.000 ∗ -0.083 ∗ 0.028 0.809
Prob. head self-empl. agric. – – -0.269 -0.339
HH. holds land (dummy) 0.000 ∗ 0.021 0.000 0.008
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban – – -0.017 -0.183
East Forest – – 0.034 -0.168
West Forest – – -0.060 -0.104
Savannah – – 0.014 -0.226
No. ofobservations 8 583 3 514
Pseudo R2 0.372 0.357
Notes: ∗ = coeﬃcient signiﬁcative at the 5% level, where inactivity is the reference category. If no marginal
eﬀect is noted, the corresponding coeﬃcient was restricted to 0. Besides the variables noted in the table, the
model includes the following explicative variables: born in urban area, religion, square root of household (hh.)
size, number of women in hh., dummy if inactive adults in hh. (without accounting for the individual itself),
and mean age of other hh. members.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
assumed that Uij is the maximum among the J utilities, Uij >U ik ∀ k  = j.T h e
J disturbances υij are supposed to be independent and identically distributed with
Weibull distribution. Thus, the model can be estimated by a multinomial logit model
(McFadden 1973, 1984). Theoretically, it would be more correct to estimate the
discrete labour supply functions simultaneously using a multinomial probit model,
allowing the random terms υij to be correlated with each other. For the sake of sim-
plicity, the multinomial logit model is used.10 Another issue, which is not addressed,
concerns the connection between labour supply choices and migration. Vijverberg
(1993) has shown that these two decisions may be intertwined for the Ivorian labour
10The assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) was rejected by the usual
Hausman test for the following outcomes, type of individuals and years: family help, wage work, and
non-farm self-employment of spouses 1992/93; wage work of spouses 1998.
13Table 4c.
Occupational choice – other household members, multinomial logit model,
marginal eﬀects evaluated at sample means
family wage self-empl.
help labour non-agric.
Expl. variable 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
Schooling -0.023 ∗ -0.001 ∗ 0.006 ∗ 0.013 ∗ 0.005 ∗ 0.006 ∗
Pot. experience 0.026 ∗ 0.012 ∗ 0.010 ∗ 0.014 ∗ 0.009 ∗ 0.009 ∗
Pot. experience2/100 -0.045 ∗ -0.026 ∗ -0.017 ∗ -0.022 ∗ -0.013 ∗ -0.014 ∗
Woman -0.163 ∗ -0.125 ∗ -0.021 ∗ -0.041 ∗ 0.047 ∗ 0.035 ∗
Non-Ivorian 0.047 ∗ -0.077 ∗ 0.011 ∗ 0.037 0.002 0.004 ∗
Prob. head wage labour -0.152 ∗ -0.060 -0.039 ∗ -0.031 -0.030 ∗ 0.000
Prob. head self-empl. non-agric. 0.257 ∗ 0.329 ∗ -0.030 -0.094 -0.002 -0.009
Prob. head self-empl. agric. 0.561 ∗ 0.710 ∗ -0.054 -0.236 ∗ -0.033 -0.047
HH. holds land (dummy) – – – – – –
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban 0.095 ∗ 0.155 ∗ -0.019 -0.059 ∗ -0.003 0.008 ∗
East Forest 0.230 ∗ 0.329 ∗ -0.051 ∗ -0.083 -0.023 -0.001
West Forest 0.185 ∗ 0.141 ∗ -0.035 -0.062 -0.060 ∗ 0.004
Savannah 0.335 ∗ 0.369 ∗ -0.087 ∗ -0.067 -0.013 -0.014
self-empl. (Ref.)
agricult. inactivity
Expl. variable 1993 1998 1993 1998
Schooling 0.000 0.000 0.013 -0.018
Pot. experience 0.000 ∗ 0.000 ∗ -0.046-0.036
Pot. experience2/100 0.000 ∗ 0.000 ∗ 0.075 0.062
Woman -0.002 ∗ -0.002 ∗ 0.138 0.133
Non-Ivorian -0.001 -0.001 -0.059 0.037
Prob. head wage labour 0.007 ∗ -0.001 0.214 0.092
Prob. head self-empl. non-agric. 0.003 ∗ -0.007 -0.228 -0.219
Prob. head self-empl. agric. – – -0.474 -0.425
HH. holds land (dummy) 0.007 ∗ 0.007 ∗ -0.004 -0.004
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban 0.002 ∗ -0.003 -0.075 -0.101
East Forest 0.002 ∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.159 -0.240
West Forest 0.001 -0.004 ∗ -0.091 -0.080
Savannah 0.002 ∗ -0.005 ∗ -0.238 -0.282
No. ofobservations 10 867 5 180
Pseudo R2 0.325 0.328
Notes: ∗ = coeﬃcient signiﬁcative at the 5% level, where inactivity is the reference category. If no marginal
eﬀect is noted, the corresponding coeﬃcient was restricted to 0. Besides the variables noted in the table, the
model includes the following explicative variables: born in urban area, religion, matrimonial status, being
child of the household head, square root of household (hh.) size, number of inactive adults in hh. (without
accounting for the individual itself), mean schooling of other hh. members, and mean age of other hh.
members.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
market.
The model is estimated for both surveys (1992/93 and 1998) and separately for the
household head, his/her spouse, and the other household members. Theoretically it
is plausible that labour supply decisions in the household are interdependent. This
is taken into account by assuming a kind of sequential decision process, where the
household head chooses ﬁrst, and the other household members afterwards condi-
tional on the decision of the household head. The decision of the household head
is introduced in the occupational choice functions of the other household members
in the form of estimated probabilities to ﬁnd the household head as wage worker,
14non-farm self-employed, or farmer. In the sample used there are very few household
heads working as family help, therefore this opportunity is not modelled for house-
hold heads and the individuals concerned are coded as inactive. Likewise, only a few
household members other than the household head simultaneously run a farm and
have employment as wage worker. For them, only the main activity is modelled.11
The marginal eﬀects associated with the estimated coeﬃcients, calculated at the
sample means, are recorded in Tables 4a-c. They provide information about the
sensitivity of the probability of choosing occupation j if the explicative variable x
varies by one percent. To save space only the marginal eﬀects of the most important
coeﬃcients are presented.12
The most striking changes in preferences occurred for those associated to years of
schooling, land and regional dummies and to occupational choice of the household
head.
The simulation of occupational choices under alternative preferences requires, as men-
tioned in section 3, to draw residuals for the multinominal logit model. The same
method is used as Fournier (1999), which allows residuals to be generated which
are compatible with the observed occupational choices and the hypothesis about the
distribution of the disturbance term of the multinominal logit model (see Appendix
A).
3.2 Estimation of the wage and proﬁt functions
Three main income sources are distinguished: wage income from a dependent activity,
proﬁts from farming, and proﬁts from a non-farm independent activity.
Estimation of the wage functions
For wage workers, a typical semi-logarithmic mincerian potential wage equation (Min-
cer 1974) is estimated, with education and professional experience as central variables.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the monthly wage w (before taxes and
transfers). Whereas in the Enquˆ e t ed eN i v e a ud eV i e1998 all wage workers were
asked their wage, in the Enquˆ ete Prioritaire 1992/93 only the ﬁrst and second deci-
sion maker of each household were asked. This means that particularly wage income
from very young household members is often unknown. It is obvious that this selec-
tion introduces a bias in the mean of the observed wages and in the estimated returns
11Individuals drawn from the simulation as family help are assigned to the family business as
follows: If the household possesses a farm, the individual is assigned as family help to the farm. If the
family possesses one or more family non-farm business the individual is assigned to the business which
is conducted by the household member with the highest order number in the survey questionnaire.
If the household possesses a non-farm business and a farm, a random number out of an uniform
distribution is drawn and the individual is assigned with a probability 50:50 to one of the two. If two
members of one household are drawn as farmers from the simulation, the one with the highest order
number is assigned as farm manager and the other as family help.
12The used speciﬁcation implicitly assumes that there is no ﬁxed cost involved in switching from
wage labour to non-farm self-employment, but there is indeed no other assumption to make in the
absence of any information about capital goods relevant for non-farm self-employment.
15to the diﬀerent earnings determinants. This selection eﬀect has to be corrected in
addition to the selection “being a wage worker or not”. To do this a tobit model
(Heckman 1979) is used.13 In the simulation model, wages were imputed in both
reference years (1992/93 and 1998), for individuals working as wage workers, but for
whom earnings had not been observed using the estimated wage equation, and by
drawing normally distributed residuals out of N(0, ˆ σ2
u), where ˆ σ2
u is the estimated
residual variance in the estimated wage equation. Likewise, potential wages are cal-
culated for the individuals not observed as wage workers, but drawn as such during
the simulation exercise.
Another diﬃculty in the 1992/93 survey stems from the fact that the individuals were
not asked their exact wage, but instead to situate it in one of nine diﬀerent income
classes and to give the corresponding period during which this wage was earned
(day, week, month, or year). To keep the analysis simple, the discrete observations
are transformed into continuous ones by simulating residuals following the method
d e s c r i b e di nG o u r i e r o u xet al. (1987) (see Appendix B), rather than carrying out
maximum likelihood estimations using the discrete values of the wages directly.
Table 5a
Wage equation – men, urban, selection model (Full MLE)
Dependent variable
log monthly wage 1992/93 1998
Schooling 0.125 (0.007) 0.094 (0.007)
Pot. experience 0.057 (0.010) 0.048 (0.008)
Pot. experience2/100 -0.046(0.015) -0.034 (0.013)
Non-Ivorian -0.244 (0.035) -0.091 (0.056)
Multi-activity (IV) -0.274 (0.066) 0.114 (0.134)
Abidjan 0.211 (0.031) 0.211 (0.050)
Intercept 9.605 (0.283) 10.094 (0.177)
ρ -0.362 (0.163) -0.725 (0.051)
ˆ σu 0.684 0.924
No. ofobservations 6873 2 510
No. ofuncensored observations 22 2 2 10 5 7
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The explicative variables in the selection model are: schooling, age,
square of age, matrimonial status, relationship to household (hh.) head, dummy if migrated during the last
ﬁve years, number of adult men in hh., number of adult women in hh., and number of inactive adults in hh
(without accounting for the individual itself). Concerning the instrumentation of “multi-activity” see section
4.2.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
The model is speciﬁed separately for men living in urban areas and men living in rural
areas, because of the diﬀerent structures of urban and rural labour markets in Cˆ ote
13The variables determining the position of an individual in the household are proven to be a subset
of the variables determining the participation process. Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcients of the
wage equation using two separate selection equations are almost identical to the estimated coeﬃcients
using only one selection equation. Accordingly, the speciﬁcation of one common selection equation
can be considered as suﬃcient. To be consistent with the occupational choice model (section 3.1),
multiple choices should be taken into account in the selection model of the wage equation. However
speciﬁcations along the lines of Lee (1983) with a selection process over multiple choices rely on
strong distributional assumptions about the error terms. Thus, to keep the model simple, the usual
Heckman speciﬁcation is used.
16Table 5b
Wage equation – men, rural, selection model (Full MLE)
Dependent variable
log monthly wage 1993 1998
Schooling 0.222 (0.023) 0.192 (0.017)
Pot. experience 0.102 (0.023) 0.090 (0.017)
Pot. experience2/100 -0.118 (0.034) -0.117 (0.027)
Non-Ivorian 0.551 (0.178) 0.414 (0.154)
Multi-activity (IV) -0.908 (0.162) -0.149 (0.152)
East Forest (Ref.)
West Forest -0.478 (0.144) 0.408 (0.123)
Savannah 0.421 (0.156) -0.039 (0.142)
Intercept 7.022 (0.579) 7.796(0.438)
ρ 0.014 (0.145) 0.042 (0.130)
ˆ σu 1.304 1.162
No. ofobservations 6198 3 494
No. ofuncensored observations 558 521
x
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The explicative variables in the selection model are: schooling, age,
square of age, relationship to household (hh.) head, square root of hh. size, dummy if migrated during the
last ﬁve years, number of inactive adults in hh. (without accounting for the individual itself), and dummies
for ethnic aﬃliation. Concerning the instrumentation of “multi-activity” see section 4.2.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
Table 5c
Wage equation – women, selection model (Full MLE)
Dependent variable
log monthly wage 1992/93 1998
Schooling 0.192 (0.016) 0.134 (0.025)
Pot. experience 0.080 (0.015) 0.090 (0.014)
Pot. experience2/100 -0.078 (0.023) -0.126(0.023)
Other urban (Ref.)
Abidjan 0.237 (0.075) -0.112 (0.099)
Rural -0.907 (0.134) -0.477 (0.115)
Intercept 8.528 (0.379) 9.078 (0.688)
ρ -0.081 (0.108) -0.266 (0.269)
ˆ σu 0.771 0.991
No. ofobservations 15 985 6784
No. ofuncensored observations 477 545
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The explicative variables in the selection model are: schooling, age,
square of age, matrimonial status, relationship to household (hh.) head, dummy if migrated during the last
ﬁve years, square root of hh. size, number of men in hh., number of women in hh., and number of inactive
adults in hh. (without accounting for the individual itself).
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
d’Ivoire. For women, this diﬀerence seems less pronounced, therefore for this segment
only one model is estimated, but a dummy variable for rural location is introduced.
To account for the multiple activities of some wage workers, a dummy variable is
introduced in the wage equation taking the value 1 if the individual supplies labour
as wage earner and independent farmer (Y = wf), and 0 otherwise (Y  = wf). It is
obvious that this dummy cannot be treated as exogenous and must be instrumented.
As Fournier (1999) does, the diﬀerence between the predicted probabilities “to be
wage earner and independent farmer”, ˜ Pwf, and “to be only wage earner”, ˜ Pw,f r o m
the multinomial logit model (see section 4.1) is used as instrument. The idea behind
17this instrumentation is that an individual who supplies the two forms of labour gets
a higher utility than by supplying only wage work, which implies Uwf >U w.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the wage equations show a general decrease in returns
to schooling and a narrowing of the wage diﬀerential between Ivorians and Non-
Ivorians over the period under study. Furthermore, a strong regional redistribution
of returns in rural Cˆ ote d’Ivoire in favour of the West Forest Region can be noted.
The dispersion of earnings due to unobserved wage determinants, increased for men
in urban areas and for women, and declined for men in rural areas.
Estimation of the non-agricultural proﬁt functions
For the self-employed with a non-farm business, the same type of semi-logarithmic
model as for wage workers is estimated. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the declared monthly individual earnings (before taxes and transfers) of the person
who declared running a non-farm business. A central argument in the non-farm
proﬁt function is the number of uncompensated family members involved (including
the manager).14 This variable has to be considered as endogenous. However, the
attempt to instrument this variable has led to unstable estimates, and the usual
Hausman speciﬁcation test did not reject the hypothesis of a non-systematic diﬀerence
between the IV estimator and the simple OLS estimator. One explanation could be
that the majority of non-farm enterprises employed no additional household members,
and very few employed two or more additional household members. Further ﬁrm and
manager characteristics, like the region of the ﬁrms location, education, experience,
and the sex of the manager are introduced in the proﬁt functions. Unfortunately
the data sets contain no usable information about potentially important productive
assets in a ﬁrm.
The problem encountered in the 1992/93 survey of missing declarations of earnings
for individuals not among the ﬁrst and second decision makers in their household and
of earnings which are only declared in classes is solved in the same way as for wage
workers (see above).
The most striking feature emerging from the estimations is the decline in productivity
of an additional person involved in the business between 1992/93 and 1998 (Table 6).
Furthermore, the earnings diﬀerentials between regions show that the West Forest
almost caught up with the earnings level in the stratum “other cities” in 1998. In
contrast, earnings in the Savannah region relatively lost ground. The residual variance
remained more or less constant.
Estimation of the agricultural proﬁt functions
The dependent variable of the agricultural proﬁt function is the logarithm of earn-
14Labour supplied in the enterprise by family members is not directly recorded in the enterprise
module. But, in the case where several members in the household run a business, provided family work
can be deducted by combining employment status and industry codes in the employment module.
Hours supplied by family workers are not available in the data set, so the quantity of work has to be
approximated by the number of family members involved.
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Non-agriculture proﬁt function, selection model (Full MLE)
Dependent variable
log monthly proﬁt 1992/93 1998
No. of household members
involved in business 0.185 (0.032) 0.127 (0.046)
Schooling 0.076(0.006 ) 0.079 (0.008)
Pot. experience 0.059 (0.006) 0.073 (0.011)
Pot. experience2/100 -0.070 (0.008) -0.081 (0.015)
Woman -0.689 (0.035) -0.729 (0.059)
Abidjan (Ref.)
Other urban -0.188 (0.040) -0.126(0.06 3)
East Forest -0.480 (0.086) -0.558 (0.122)
West Forest -0.892 (0.103) -0.174 (0.099)
Savannah -0.294 (0.076) -0.630 (0.152)
Intercept 9.526(0.146 ) 9.216(0.253)
ρ 0.127 (0.041) 0.112 (0.084)
ˆ σu 1.0260.995
No. ofobservations 29 05612 888
No. ofuncensored observations 3 849 1 347
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Individual characteristics concern head of business. The explicative
variables in the selection model are: schooling, experience, square of experience, sex, religion, dummy for
Non-Ivorian, square root of household (hh.) size, dummy for inactive adults in hh. (without accounting for
the individual itself) , mean age of other hh. members, dummy for land property, location of residence.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
ings derived from the sale and self-consumption of agricultural products (food crops,
export crops and livestock) during the previous twelve month minus the cost of hired
labour from outside the household. The proﬁt includes the implicit wages of the
family workers and the implicit cost of the cultivated land. As mentioned above, the
number of family members involved in the farm has to be considered as endogenous
and is therefore instrumented. This assumption is conﬁrmed by a Hausman speciﬁca-
tion test, indicating that the OLS estimator is biased downward. Family composition
variables are used as instruments. The model is estimated with 2SLS. There was no
sign of a systematic self-selection into agricultural activity.
Besides the number of family members involved, the amount of available land (culti-
vated and left fallow15) is the principal argument in the agricultural proﬁt function.
Furthermore, a categorical variable is introduced whether the household owns a home
or not. Even if this asset does not directly contribute to the generation of income,
it may do so indirectly, both through its function of shelter and as collateral for
borrowing (Grootaert 1997).
Multi-activity in the sense that a farmer works periodically also as wage earner is
taken into account via a binary categorical variable in the estimation. This variable
is instrumented using the same procedure as for wage earners. In both surveys,
I detected some households with implausibly low or implausibly high agricultural
proﬁts. These households are excluded from the estimation and proﬁts are imputed,
likewise, using the same procedure as for wage earners.
15The data from 1992/93 did not allow the separation of cultivated land and that left fallow.
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Agriculture proﬁt function, 2SLS model
Dependent variable
log proﬁt last 12 month 1992/93 1998
No. of household members
involved in farm work (IV) 0.153 (0.010) 0.148 (0.014)
Land: no land or less than 1 ha (Ref.)
Land: from 1 to 2 ha 0.498 (0.045) 0.176(0.215)
Land: from 2 to 5 ha 0.723 (0.047) 0.663 (0.212)
Land: from 5 to 10 ha 1.074 (0.055) 0.932 (0.214)
Land: more than 10 ha 1.117 (0.061) 1.156 (0.213)
Homeowner 0.086(0.034) 0.296(0.055)
Pot. experience 0.017 (0.004) 0.022 (0.006)
Pot. experience2/100 -0.025 (0.005) -0.034 (0.007)
Woman -0.141 (0.040) -0.323 (0.063)
Multi-activity (IV) -0.071 (0.068) -0.183 (0.115)
East Forest (Ref.)
Urban -0.212 (0.042) -0.234 (0.085)
West Forest 0.094 (0.038) 0.319 (0.056)
Savannah 0.327 (0.036) 0.016 (0.053)
Intercept 11.618 (0.088) 11.570 (0.231)
ˆ σu 0.848 0.888
No. ofobservations 44 5 4 18 9 9
Adj. R2 0.359 0.298
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Individual characteristics concern head of business. The instrumental
variables for “number of household members (hh.) involved in farm work” are: square root of hh. size, number
of adult men in hh., number of adult women in hh., number of children 0 to 5 years old in hh., number of
children 6to 14 years old in hh., number of inactive adults in hh., mean schooling of hh. members. Concerning
the instrumentation of “multi-activity” see section 4.2.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; estimations by the author.
Despite the positive evolution of the export crop sector, the return to family members
involved remained constant, and the return to land decreased, particularly for small
scale farmers, i.e. mainly food crop farmers (Table 7). However, it is obvious that
the number of involved family members is only a very approximative measure of the
amount of labour supplied. The participating household members may have reduced
on average their supplied hours of work. Analysis of the data showed that the quantity
of land held by households increased signiﬁcantly between 1993 and 1998. Therefore,
it seems that the increase in agricultural production (which took place as well as the
price boost) was mainly due to an expansion in cultivated land and hired labour.
However, further data has to be checked to verify if the increase in available land,
observed in the data, is real or simply a measurement error.16
The relative price increase of export crops is entirely reﬂected by the change of the
coeﬃcients associated to the regional dummies. The West Forest is the principal
region for the cultivation of cocoa and coﬀee, so the evolution of the coeﬃcients
yields what can be expected.
16In harmony with this evolution, the Enquˆ e t ed eN i v e a ud eV i e1995 already shows an increase
in the average amount of land held by households.
204 Decomposition by microsimulation of the evolution of
income distribution
Abidjan
The simulation model suggests that the increase in inequality by 3.1 points in the
Gini coeﬃcient observed for Abidjan between 1992 and 1998 resulted from various
forces which partly oﬀset each other (Table 8). 17
Table 8
Decomposition by microsimulation of the change in the distribution of household income
per adult equivalent (Oxford scale)
Initial population 1992/93 Initial population 1998
Gini dGini E(0) dE(0) Gini dGini E(0) dE(0)
ABIDJAN
Initial values 0.497 0.505 0.529 0.692
Observed change 0.031 0.187 0.031 0.187
Price observables 0.472 -0.025 0.461 -0.044 0.570 -0.042 0.780 -0.089
Returns to school. 0.475 -0.022 0.463 -0.042 0.578 -0.049 0.804 -0.113
Returns to exp. 0.501 0.003 0.510 0.005 0.533 -0.005 0.706-0.015
Ivoir./Non-I. wage diﬀ. 0.495 -0.002 0.501 -0.004 0.530 -0.002 0.695 -0.003
Price unobservables 0.520 0.022 0.553 0.048 0.491 0.038 0.621 0.071
Total price -0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.018
Occupational choice 0.476-0.021 0.439 -0.06 6 0.529 -0.001 0.6 49 0.042
Price and occup. choice -0.024 -0.062 -0.005 0.024
Population structure eﬀect 0.055 0.249 0.0360.16 2
OTHER URBAN
Initial values 0.489 0.511 0.487 0.539
Observed change -0.002 0.028 -0.002 0.028
Price observables 0.476-0.013 0.492 -0.019 0.503 -0.0160.56 7 -0.028
Returns to school. 0.473 -0.015 0.481 -0.030 0.515 -0.029 0.596-0.057
Returns to exp. 0.485 -0.004 0.503 -0.008 0.493 -0.0060.554 -0.015
Ivoir./Non-I. wage diﬀ. 0.488 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.488 -0.001 0.541 -0.002
Returns to land 0.488 -0.001 0.511 0.000 0.484 0.003 0.533 0.006
Price unobservables 0.500 0.011 0.535 0.024 0.467 0.020 0.505 0.034
Total price -0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006
Occupational choice 0.489 0.000 0.501 -0.010 0.513 -0.0260.555 -0.016
Price and occup. choice -0.001 -0.005 -0.022 -0.010
Population structure eﬀect -0.001 0.034 0.020 0.038
The simulation of income distribution for 1992 (1998) by applying the occupational
preferences of 1998 (1992) indicates that modiﬁcations on the labour market con-
tributed to a reduction in inequality. The transition matrix (Table 9) shows that
the activity rate (population 12 years old and over outside schooling and training)
rises from 52.8 percent to 59.1 percent between 1992 and 1998, if one uses the 1988’s
preferences for 1992. The inﬂow into dependent wage work (+7 points) out of inac-
tivity and non-farm self-employment is remarkable. The simulated transitions on the
labour market are completely in line with the observed changes in the occupational
structure between 1992 and 1998. These occupational changes suggest two things.
Firstly, a part of the involuntary unemployed individuals found jobs after 1994. Sec-
ond, households tried to overcome declines in real income by an increase in labour
17In what follows mainly the Gini coeﬃcient is maintained as inequality measure, but the decom-
position can be made likewise with all other standard inequality measures.
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(...cont.)
Initial population 1992/93 Initial population 1998
Gini dGini E(0) dE(0) Gini dGini E(0) dE(0)
RURAL AREAS
Initial values 0.417 0.393 0.480 0.472
Observed change 0.063 0.079 0.063 0.079
Price observables 0.439 0.022 0.425 0.033 0.483 -0.003 0.485 -0.013
Returns to school. 0.411 -0.0060.385 -0.008 0.497 -0.017 0.501 -0.030
Returns to exp. 0.412 -0.005 0.392 0.000 0.485 -0.0060.481 -0.009
Ivoir./Non-I. wage diﬀ. 0.417 0.000 0.393 0.001 0.481 -0.001 0.474 -0.002
Returns to land 0.419 0.002 0.398 0.0060.474 0.006 0.46 3 0.009
Price unobservables 0.431 0.014 0.420 0.028 0.458 0.021 0.435 0.037
Total price 0.0360.06 0 0.018 0.023
Occupational choice 0.421 0.004 0.387 -0.0060.482 -0.003 0.472 0.000
Price and occup. choice 0.040 0.055 0.0160.024
Population structure eﬀect 0.023 0.025 0.047 0.056
NATIONAL
Initial values 0.494 0.512 0.508 0.563
Within-group inequality 0.441 0.537
Between-group inequality 0.071 0.026
Observed change 0.014 0.050 0.014 0.050
Price observables 0.483 -0.011 0.497 -0.015 0.540 -0.032 0.630 -0.067
Returns to school. 0.471 -0.023 0.473 -0.039 0.547 -0.039 0.640 -0.078
Returns to exp. 0.476-0.017 0.486-0.026 0.512 -0.004 0.573 -0.010
Ivoir./Non-I. wage diﬀ. 0.495 0.001 0.515 0.003 0.508 0.000 0.562 0.001
Regional diﬀerential 0.484 -0.010 0.496-0.016 0.511 -0.003 0.574 -0.011
Returns to land 0.489 -0.005 0.506-0.006 0.500 0.008 0.550 0.013
Price unobservables 0.498 0.004 0.525 0.013 0.482 0.0260.515 0.048
Total price -0.007 -0.002 -0.006-0.019
Occupational choice 0.4960.003 0.505 -0.007 0.515 -0.007 0.557 0.006
Price and occup. choice -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013
Population structure eﬀect 0.019 0.060 0.028 0.064
Notes: E(0) is the mean logarithmic deviation. Positive change=disequalizing eﬀect from 1992/93 to 1998.
Negative change=equalizing eﬀect from 1992/93 to 1998.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; simulations by the author.
market activity of former voluntary unemployed family members. The necessary sup-
plement jobs were provided thanks to the recovery of private investment after the
devaluation.
In the same way as the occupational choice eﬀect, the price eﬀect also tended towards a
more equal distribution (-3.4 points in Gini on average over both simulations), mainly
via a drop in the return to schooling and a decline in the wage diﬀerential between
Ivorians and Non-Ivorians. The major factor behind these two eﬀects may be the
freezing of wages in the public sector.
In contrast, inequality increased due to changes in the returns to unobserved earnings
determinants, possibly reﬂecting more heterogeneity in working time among individ-
uals. One can also assume that the major macroeconomic events (devaluation, boom
of cocoa and coﬀee world market prices, adjustment policy) aﬀected in a very distinct
way the diﬀerent sectors of the economy and thus led to a higher residual variance.
Likewise, changes in the socio-economic population structure had a non-equalizing
22Table 9
Simulated changes in occupational choices (in percent)
Simulated with 1998 occupational choice behaviour
wage s-empl. s-empl. fam. wage/ Total
observed 1992/93 inact. lab. non-a. agric. help s-agr. 1992
ABIDJAN
inactive 81.3 11.64.60.8 1.8 0 47.2
pure wage labour 1.9 94.3 3.1 0.1 0.7 0 26.9
self-empl. non-a. 6.6 13.1 79.3 0.5 0.4 0 22.3
self-empl. agric. 0 23.9 9.8 66.3 0 0 0.5
family help 17.5 14.9 2.1 6.2 59.3 0 2.9
wage labour/s-empl. agric. 13.3 52.66 .3 0 0 27.8 0.3
Total 1998  40.9 34.5 20.8 1.0 2.8 0.1 100
OTHER URBAN
inactive 85.3 5.4 3.4 0.5 5.4 0 38.4
pure wage labour 3.4 91.3 3.4 0.1 1.7 0.1 15.7
self-empl. non-a. 10.3 8.7 75.5 0.4 5.0 0.1 25.3
self-empl. agric. 10.0 13.2 6.1 62.7 1.4 6.7 6.7
family help 16.1 6.9 4.3 3.7 69.0 0 12.0
wage labour/s-empl. agric. 3.4 20.2 1.4 2.7 0.0 72.3 1.8
Total 1998  38.620.6 21.9 5.0 12.0 1.8 100
RURAL AREAS
inactive 72.3 3.61.9 1.5 20.1 0.6 13.7
pure wage labour 0.5 90.8 0.5 0.66 .5 1.2 2.8
self-empl. non-a. 6.0 10.6 58.0 1.7 22.5 1.2 5.5
self-empl. agric. 2.5 5.4 0.9 83.60.8 6 .7 24.8
family help 7.5 4.9 2.7 1.3 83.7 0 50.6
wage labour/s-empl. agric. 0 14.8 0.3 6.3 0.0 78.6 2.6
Total 1998  14.67.8 5.1 21.8 46 .7 3.9 100
NATIONAL
inactive 79.67.0 3.3 0.9 8.9 0.2 25.2
pure wage labour 2.1 92.7 2.8 0.2 2.0 0.2 10.0
self-empl. non-a. 8.0 10.672.2 0.8 8.0 0.4 12.9
self-empl. agric. 3.1 6.2 1.4 81.7 0.9 6.7 16.4
family help 8.3 5.2 2.8 1.5 82.2 0 33.5
wage labour/s-empl. agric. 1.0 16.9 0.7 5.4 0.0 76.0 2.0
Total 1998  24.615.5 11.6 14.4 31.2 2.7 100
Notes: In this table, but not in the simulation model, family workers in a non-agricultural business and family
helpers in a farm are aggregated.
Source: EP 1992/93 and ENV 1998; simulations by the author.
eﬀect on income distribution. Factors behind this phenomenon may have been the
rejuvenation of the population and longer school enrolment of the young. Indeed,
natural population growth and immigration are still high in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, so that each
year, particularly in Abidjan, a large number of young people come onto the labour
market, with no experience and hence potentially low wages. In the framework of the
adjustment program, the public administration stopped recruiting school graduates,
which destroyed potentially favourable posts for the young. On average younger
cohorts also stay longer in school and contribute thus less or nothing to the family
income.18 Another factor, included in the population eﬀect, could be the higher
mortality of adults of working age due to AIDS.
If the decomposition is performed for the two alternative poverty indicators the pic-
ture is quite similar in the sense that factors which reduced inequality also reduced
18Of course, the long term eﬀects may be very positive.
23poverty (table not presented). Changes in returns to observed earnings determinants
and changes in occupational preferences reduced poverty. Modiﬁcations in returns to
unobserved earnings determinants and variations of the socio-demographic popula-
tion structure increased poverty. However, it is interesting to see that a change in the
returns to schooling had a decreasing eﬀect on inequality, but an increasing eﬀect on
poverty. The direction and magnitude of household income changes due to modiﬁca-
tions in occupational choices and returns to observables and unobservables can also
be seen in Figure 1, which shows the relative change of mean household income for
each household income centile by performing the three counterfactual simulations.
Figure 1
Relative change of mean household income for each household income centile, when performing the three
counterfactual simulations for Abidjan using as starting point 1992 (smoothing by a cubic spline)
Other urban
In the other urban centres of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire inequality remained constant. However,
as the microsimulation exercise shows (Table 8), changes in the returns to diﬀerent
earnings determinants worked in favour of a more equal distribution. As in Abidjan,
a drop in the return to education had a homogenizing eﬀect on incomes.
In contrast, changes in the returns to unobserved earnings determinants contributed
obviously to a higher dispersion of household incomes (approximately +1.5 points in
Gini).
The simulation of occupational choices by taking one population as starting point
24and applying the occupational preferences of the other year, produces an increase
in wage labour, a decrease in non-agricultural and agricultural independent activity,
and a more or less constant share working as family help (Table 9). These evolutions
had an equalizing but weak eﬀect on income distribution. Using the population of
1993 as initial population implies that even the pure occupational choice eﬀect was
close to zero.
As in Abidjan and rural areas (see below), changes in the population structure had
a non-equalizing eﬀect. Possible factors behind this phenomenon may be similar to
those outlined above for Abidjan, including internal migration.
Whereas the degree of inequality remained constant between 1993 and 1998, poverty
decreased by 3 points if the poverty line of US$1 and by 5.5 points if the poverty line
of US$2 is retained. This reduction was reached mainly be the channel of changes
in the returns to observed earnings determinants, even if partly oﬀset by a higher
dispersion of the returns to unobserved earnings determinants. This can be seen
very clearly in Figure 2. The changes mentioned in occupational preferences and the
socio-demographic population structure had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on poverty (table
not presented).
Figure 2
Relative change of mean household income for each household income centile, when performing the three
counterfactual simulations for other urban areas using as starting point 1993 (smoothing by a cubic spline)
25Rural areas
Rural areas experienced a strong increase in inequality with a Gini coeﬃcient rising
from 0.42 in 1993 to 0.48 in 1998. Changes in participation behaviour led to a higher
proportion of the population involved in dependent wage work and a lower proportion
involved in independent non-farm, or farm activities (Table 9). However, as the
descriptive statistics in Table 3 show, even if the total share of farmers decreased
(-7.5 percentage points among men), the share of export crop farmers remained more
or less constant. That is what we can expect in the context of a devaluation and
increasing international prices for coﬀee and cocoa. In particular, part of the food
crop farmers became, what I call “export crop farmer” simply because of pure price
eﬀects (here a farmer is considered as an export crop farmer, if sales of cocoa, coﬀee
and cotton represent more than 50% of the total value of agricultural production
(33% in the Savannah region)), or by eﬀectively substituting food crop production by
export crop production. In addition, a signiﬁcant share of food crop farmers reduced
their labour supply on their own farms and started working as wage workers on the
larger cocoa or coﬀee plantations or in agro-industry (this is in line with the increase
of multi-activity, +36% among men). These latter changes in occupational choices
explain the overall reduction in independent farmers. The share of wage workers may
have also increased as a result of immigrants from neighbouring countries who found
work on the Ivorian cocoa and coﬀee plantations.
Figure 3
Relative change of mean household income for each household income centile, when performing the three
counterfactual simulations for rural areas using as starting point 1993 (smoothing by a cubic spline)
26Concerning the eﬀect of isolated changes in occupational preferences on income in-
equality, the two simulation variants might seem ambiguous. Taking the population
of 1993 as initial population implies a slightly more unequal income distribution. In
contrast, taking the population of 1998 as initial population implies a slightly more
equal income distribution (see Table 8). This raises thus the problem of “path de-
pendence” (see section 3).19 However, the distributional eﬀects, whether equalizing
or non-equalizing, are so small that we should rather concentrate on the eﬀects of
changes in returns, which seem much more important.
The decrease in the returns to land, particularly for small scale farmers (thus mostly
food crop farmers) as well as changes in the returns to unobserved earnings determi-
nants had a non-equalizing eﬀect on the income distribution. Important unobserved
factors may be the use of fertilizers and market access. In contrast decreasing returns
to schooling (concerns only wage workers and self-employed outside agriculture) and
potential experience had an equalizing eﬀect. Together, price changes had a strong
non-equalizing eﬀect. This can be clearly seen in Figure 3, showing that the upper
tail of the household income distribution knew signiﬁcant income gains.
Changes in the socio-demographic population structure, including possible changes
in the distribution of land,20 worked towards a more unequal income distribution.
In spite of the increase in inequality, poverty signiﬁcantly decreased in rural areas.
The simulations show that this decline is mainly due to modiﬁcations in remuneration
rates of observed and unobserved earnings determinants. Occupational choices per
se had a poverty enhancing eﬀect. But in connection with the price changes they
allowed a large part of the rural population to rise above the poverty line (table not
presented).
National – all regions
After analyzing the forces behind the evolution of inequality in the three diﬀerent
strata “Abidjan”, “other cities”, and “rural”, it is interesting to see how these forces
interacted at the national level. The decomposition of the evolution of the mean log-
arithmic deviation shows (Table 8), that within-region inequality increased, whereas
between-region inequality decreased, such that overall inequality rose only slightly.
The share of urban households among the poor increased from 28 to 37 percent and
from 31 to 38 percent if the US$1 poverty line and the US$2 poverty line respectively
is retained. This result conﬁrms the phenomenon of an urbanization of poverty in
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, which was also stated by Grimm, Gu´ enard and Meslpl´ e-Somps (2001).
19The problem of “path dependance” arises frequently in this type of decomposition. For instance,
in the Indonesian study of Alatas and Bourguignon (2000), this problem appears when trying to
distinguish the respective contribution of changes in occupational preferences and changes in the
socio-demographic population structure. The authors assume that unobserved determinants of mi-
gration decisions, which should indeed only be taken into account by changes in the socio-demographic
population structure, introduce a bias in the occupational choice functions.
20It is evident that the treatment of the input “land” as an exogenous given “endowment” is less
satisfactory. Investment in land, and decisions about its use are without doubt crucial behaviours
even in the short and medium term.
27The simulations (Table 8) show that the changes in returns to observed earnings
determinants had an equalizing eﬀect on overall income distribution (Gini -1 to -3
points). Changes in returns to schooling and experience as well as regional remuner-
ation diﬀerentials contributed mainly to this decline. Modiﬁcations in the variance of
unobserved income determinants had a non-equalizing eﬀect (Gini +0.4 to 2.6 points).
Possible explanations have been given above. Changes in the employment structure
had only a weak distributional eﬀect. In contrast, changes in the socio-demographic
population structure had a non-equalizing eﬀect in all three strata and thus also on
the national level.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this study was to analyse Ivorian income distribution between 1992/93
and 1998, to identify the various forces behind its evolution, and to connect them with
the profound economic and socio-demographic changes which occurred in the 1990s,
including the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 and the accompanying structural
adjustment policy.
The microsimulations show that in Abidjan changes in the employment structure, i.e.
a decline in unemployment, a higher activity rate and a boost in employment in the
private (formal) wage sector, in connection with changes in the returns to observed
earnings determinants on the labour market led to less inequality and poverty. How-
ever, these eﬀects were oﬀset on the one hand by more heterogeneity in unobserved
earnings determinants, probably due to the very distinct impact of macroeconomic
shocks on the diﬀerent economic sectors, and, on the other hand, by changes in the
population structure.
In contrast, rural areas experienced strong growth in household income accompanied
by a signiﬁcant rise in inequality but also a remarkable decline in poverty. The
major factors behind the rise in inequality were changes in the socio-demographic
population structure and changes in returns on the labour market. Changes in the
employment structure per se had only a weak distributional eﬀect. Furthermore, the
positive evolution of the export crop sector beneﬁtted mainly the West Forest region,
which also led to rising income diﬀerentials within rural Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. However, the
changes in returns to the observed and unobserved earnings determinants allowed a
large part of rural households to increase their incomes and to escape poverty.
Concerning the growth and inequality link, it is interesting to ﬁnd that both the nega-
tive income growth in Abidjan and the positive income growth in rural Cˆ ote d’Ivoire,
were connected with rising inequality. However, the devaluation of the CFA Franc,
and the structural adjustment program (including the recovery of international aid),
coupled with the price boom in the coﬀee/cocoa sector caused a signiﬁcant redis-
tribution between rural and urban areas.21 Within-region inequality increased and
21...which would have been even higher if the CAISTAB had not absorbed a part of the surplus
due to the increase in coﬀee and cocoa prices.
28between-region inequality decreased. The share of the urban population among the
poor rose, whereas that of the rural population declined. Thus the Ivorian experience
between 1993 and 1998 is quiet diﬀerent from that of the 1980s. The 1980s were
marked by a phase of structural adjustment (without devaluation of the currency)
followed by a phase of destabilization. Grootaert (1995), for example, showed that
during this period poverty rose in urban areas as well as in the countryside, especially
among export crop farmers.
The ﬁndings in this paper comply with most of the short and medium term predic-
tions of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models applied to the Ivorian case.
Cogneau and Collange (1998), for instance, predict, as a result of the devaluation, a
reduction in unemployment by almost 2 points as well as a regression of real incomes
in urban areas, but an increase in real incomes in rural areas. They also ﬁnd, a strong
redistribution between the urban and rural sector, and thus a decrease in between-
inequality. Bourguignon, de Melo and Suwa-Eisenmann (1995) underline the role of
wage moderation in diminishing unemployment and thus allowing the industry to
beneﬁt fully from the devaluation. In contrast, whereas the CGE models predicted
income stability for urban (informal) self-employed workers, this study suggests that
their earnings declined.
However, recent evolutions in the world market prices of export crops show that a
large part of the Ivorian population remains vulnerable. Furthermore, the political
instability evident since December 1999 and the subsequent freeze of international
aid discourages and hinders private investment, suggesting that the Ivorian economy
today faces a crisis comparable to that experienced at the beginning of the 1990s.
I believe that this case study provides deep insights about the possible links between
growth, inequality and poverty during macroeconomic adjustment, which may apply
to other countries too. However, it is obvious that the chosen approach is not without
its limits. A complete representation of the equilibrating process on the labour market
would be more satisfactory, but this would go beyond the scope of this paper, and
will therefore be left for future work.
Appendix
A Simulation of residuals for the multinomial logit model
As shown by Fournier (1999), it is possible to generate residuals for the multino-
mial logit model that are compatible with the observed occupational choices and the
hypothesis about the distribution of the disturbance term of the multinomial logit
model.
The individual utility derived by the occupation of labour market choice j can be
written as:
Uj = λ 
jxj + υj, (9)
29where xj is a vector of individual and household characteristics and υj are residuals,
which are independent and identically distributed with Weibull distribution (McFad-
den 1973).
The observed occupational choice for the individual under study is denoted j◦.T h u s ,
it is obvious, that a conditional distribution has to be determined such that:
F(υj| ˆ λj
 
xj◦ + υj◦ > max
j =j◦( ˆ λj
 
xj + υj)). (10)
If the conditional densities, independent of the error term of the labour supply func-
tions, are denoted as f(υj), and ˆ λ xj as gj, the conditional density for the individuals
























F(υj◦ + gj◦ − gj).
Through integration by parts and the speciﬁcation of the multinomial logit model,
one obtains:









Likewise, once simulated the residual of the observed occupation (˜ υj◦), the residuals
associated to the remaining occupations can be obtained by:
F(υj|υj <g j◦ +˜ υj◦ − gj)=
F(υj)
F(gj◦ +˜ υj◦ − gj)
, ∀j  = j◦ (13)
which yields under the speciﬁcation of the multinomial logit model:
F(υj◦|act = j◦)=
exp(−exp(−υj))
exp(−exp(gj − gj◦ − ˜ υj◦))
. (14)
The conditional distributions deﬁned in (12) and (14) can be easily inverted, and
residuals can be calculated by drawing Fj’s and Fj◦’s from a uniform distribution on
the interval [0,1].
B Transformation of discrete to continuous earnings
In the Enquˆ ete Prioritaire 1992/93 individuals were not asked their exact wage, but
instead to situate it in one of nine diﬀerent income classes and to give the corre-
sponding period during which this wage was earned (day, week, month, or year).22
22Almost 100 percent of the declarations concern wages per month or per year.
30This section explains how I simulated continuous values of the unobservable endoge-
nous variable, following a method proposed by Gourieroux et al. (1987), afterwards
allowing to implement the same regression and diagnostic tools as for the 1998 data.
Knowing that the logarithm of the unobserved monthly wage w∗
i of individual i is
included in the interval [ln(Wli),ln(Wui)], a tobit model of the following form can be
formulated:
ln(Wli) <β  xi +  i < ln(Wui)w i t h  ∼ N(0,σ2
 ), (15)
where xi is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables such as education, experience
etc. The error term,  i, is assumed to be normally distributed across observations.
Using maximum likelihood techniques, an estimate of the parameter vector β and of
the residual variance σ2

















where φ( ) is the standard cumulative normal.
It is now possible to simulate values zi for the logarithm of the latent endogenous
variable from the conditional distributions of ln(w∗
i ), given ln(Wli)a n dl n ( Wui)b y
drawing residuals ui out of N(0, ˆ σ ) such that,
ln(Wli) < ˆ β xi + u∗
i < ln(Wui), (17)
and thus
zi = ˆ β xi + u∗
i. (18)
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